

TOWARDS A NEW PHILOSOPHY  
OF WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY

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by  
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

TOWARD A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY  
(By Dean N. McDowell March 1961)

The U.S. today finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. It's leaders must coordinate military and foreign policy so as to attain U.S. National objectives without giving away before the diverse and multi-pronged advances of world Communism on the one hand and without initiating full scale atomic war on the other.

U.S. preoccupation with total war has caused it to deemphasize means of combatting less direct, more ambiguous yet equally dangerous types of Communist aggression. Reliance on one weapon and one strategy, namely massive retaliation as the cornerstone of U.S. policy has placed our statesmen and military man in an atomic straight jacket and given them little flexibility of maneuver. It has encouraged the Communists to turn to other methods by which they seek to take over the world on the installment plan. Neglect of means of waging limited and unconventional warfare may confront this country with the choice of total war or inaction in its efforts to honor its world wide system of collective security arrangements.

Total War has not always been the state of the art. Rather limited war for limited gains has often been the rule rather than the exception throughout history. Under the threat of nuclear warfare the pendulum may again be swinging back to this concept.

Americans too must revise their concept of war and peace and force us tools of foreign policy. Americans have generally tended to regard international politics in somewhat idealistic terms where everything should be harmonious and above power politics. War and peace are thought of as opposite which have no continuity to the political battle. Thus foreign policy made during times

of peace has often been made with little regard to military consideration. Likewise, when at war, future foreign policy considerations have been ignored and only military aspects considered. In the final analysis this has brought neither peace nor security to America. The Communists on the other hand regard conflict as natural and force and violence as an integral part of international relations. They follow the German Clausewitz's dictum that war is simply a continuation of politics by violent means. U.S. statesmen and military men must more clearly coordinate U.S. foreign policy and military considerations for the national good. War and force should not be regarded as national suicide but as a means of attaining national objectives through the judicious use of force. Wars or conflicts must not be an end unto themselves but should have a national purpose.

Because the U.S. has the strength and means for total war does not mean that it can deter and take care of the little wars. Even when the U.S. had a complete monopoly and later a clear and continuing superiority in nuclear strike power, the Communists have not been deterred from creeping aggression. This has been only too amply demonstrated by the fact that approximately 800 million people and millions of square miles have been added to their empire since the end of WW II.

Limited and unconventional war forces of the U.S. must be given more adequate means than at present. Limited war forces must be ready professional, mobile air-ground and amphibious forces, ready to move out quickly to the world's trouble spots, prepared to fight conventional or so called limited nuclear war (it's debatable whether there will ever be such a thing as limited nuclear war). Mobile seaborne Fleet Marine Forces, situated with U.S. fleets positioned around the periphery of the Eurasian heartland, are particularly suited for such tasks, especially to assist newly independent, intensely nationalistic countries that wish no foreign bases on their soil. Such forces are able to hover almost indefinitely in international

waters, off potential trouble spots with full logistic and heavy weapons in addition to carrier borne close support aircraft. Army airborne forces are also a valuable member of the limited war team for prompt intervention even though faced with over flight right problems in increasing areas of the world.

Unconventional warfare must also be given additional attention in order to exploit dissident elements among the millions held behind the iron curtain in time of conflict. Such guerilla forces among our allied friends can also give great assistance in conjunction with our limited war forces, particularly <sup>in</sup> the so called underdeveloped areas of the globe which lie exposed to Communist probing attacks.

Therefore the U.S. must have in addition to its nuclear retaliatory means, more adequate and flexible conventional forces that can be applied with discrimination and restraint to limit and defeat Communist political and military objectives.

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Therefore the U.S. must have in addition to its nuclear retaliatory means, more adequate and flexible conventional forces that can be applied with discrimination and restraint to limit and defeat Communist political and military objectives.



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## CHAPTER I

### THE INTRODUCTION

On February 27, 1961 Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, created quite a furor when he tentatively suggested that the United States might be ready to adopt a new, more flexible approach to military and foreign policy considerations, (i.e. less reliance on nuclear weapons and massive retaliation as the corner stone of United States policy). The new approach has been a long time in coming, and it is to be hoped that such a new, more forward looking, dynamic, firm, and flexible policy will be evolved before it is too late.

#### I. THE PROBLEM WE FACE

The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine certain aspects of the present United States concept of military strategy as it is purported to assist our foreign policy planners in the achievement of national objectives. It is felt that a new, hard look must be taken at such concepts, especially that of relying so heavily on nuclear weapons. The United States today finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. Our leaders must coordinate military and foreign policy so as to attain United States national objectives without giving way before the diverse multi-pronged advances of World Communism on the one hand, and

without initiating full scale atomic war on the other. Means to cope with these intermediate threats must be found and made available.

United States preoccupation with total war has caused it to de-emphasize means of combatting more ambiguous yet equally dangerous types of Communist aggression. Neglect of this conventional shield can be fatal and leave us little flexibility of action either on the battlefield or at the conference table. In an effort to honor our world wide system of collective security arrangements, we may be confronted with making only one choice, the consequences of which may be more terrible to the American people than the sacrifices necessary for more adequate, varied and responsive defense means. Under President Kennedy, there seems to be a new awakening to these threats, but will it come soon enough?

## II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

There have been many definitions of limited, total and unconventional warfare. However, generally condensed to basic principles they can be defined as follows:

Limited War - limited war in the twentieth century has a variety of shades and meanings. It is more difficult for Americans to understand than total war. Basically, it might be summed up as:

1. War where the resources of both sides are not fully extended, national survival is not immediately at stake and the homelands of the opposing sides are not subjected to devastation:
2. War which does not bring into play the entire spectrum of weapons available, such as nuclear weapons.
3. War which may be confined to a definite geographic area.
4. A war where the entire weapons system may be utilized but they are limited to certain types of military targets and to certain areas - so called limited nuclear war.<sup>1</sup>
5. A war of limited scope, often by proxy and involving in addition, threats, propaganda, and subversion.<sup>2</sup>

Total or General War - all out, or general war is much easier for Americans to comprehend. It might be defined as follows:

1. A war which seeks to achieve maximum results,

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<sup>1</sup>Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957), p. 139

<sup>2</sup>C.N. Barclay, The New Warfare, (London: William Clowes & Son, Ltd., 1953), p. ix

(i.e. the unconditional surrender to the vanquished). These wars usually end with the devastation of the country of the conquered, and since it involves the total efforts of both combatants, both are usually exhausted at its termination.

2. A war which brings into play the total resources and entire weapons spectrum of both combatants which now includes nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

Unconventional War - a new method of terminology in the Cold War, this type of warfare has only recently been recognized and defined by the Western Democracies. (Formerly, it was included in the broad scope of Barclay's definition of limited warfare, as shown in paragraph, 5, page 3 of this paper).

This area is a broad one, shading between peace and war, which can encompass guerilla attack, terrorism and sabotage, civil insurrection, mass riots, infiltration strikes, boycotts, and espionage, blending violence, non-violence and psychological warfare in the struggle for populations and mens' minds. It typifies protracted conflict and can go on for months and years and can exert a powerful effect on the final military engagement.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare in the Nuclear Era", ORBIS, A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs, (Fall 1960), pp 323-337

It can be seen at work all over the world from mass riots against Western embassies in Yugoslavia to assassinations, guerilla and terrorist activities in Asia and Africa.

## CHAPTER II

### AN OVERVIEW OF WAR AND STRATEGY

Total war, limited war and unconventional war, even though seemingly new terms to most Americans, are not a product of the twentieth century alone. They have been in use for some time, and therefore, one should examine war and strategy somewhat closer and ascertain how best the military and diplomatic considerations may be coordinated for the national good.

#### I. A NEW LOOK AT THE NEW LOOK

Some supposedly well-informed citizens state that the horror of nuclear weapons makes war impossible, thus there is no need for strategy. Such thinking shows a very one-sided and short-sighted view of the world situation today. It infers that only the military has strategy and not leaders of nations in the field of international politics. It also disregards the bloodier conventional wars of history, where for example, at Ypres in 1917, approximately 350,000 casualties occurred on both sides, where death by high explosives, suffocation in the mud and by poison gas were no less horrible than death by atomic weapon.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ernest R., and Trevor N. Dupuy, Military Heritage of America, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957), p. 374



Clausewitz, the great German military strategist of the 19th century, stated that war is simply a continuation of politics by violent means. The function then of the military establishment it would seem, is to assist in the attainment of United States national objectives as set forth by United States leaders and statesmen.. Thus there must be a close working relationship and coordination between the two in order to arrive at a national strategy. The military cannot be divorced from the diplomatic, nor can only purely military considerations largely dictate future events as in World War I and World War II. The American concept that diplomacy and defense considerations should be kept separate is outmoded and should have been dropped many years ago. Yet, when a military man and also a qualified student of political science does speak out in this vein, he is told to mind his own business by the politicians in power. The recent Defense Department 'gag rule' only goes to reinforce this concept.

Unlike some of our Old World cousins, this country has had no long tradition of strategy in international politics, generally agreed upon by both statesmen and military men alike. This has been evident in World War II, especially where the philosophy of the United States was to win the war first and then to worry about the future.

The British however, were thinking beyond World War II and purely military considerations were not paramount. For example, when Churchill proposed to the United States attacking the soft underbelly of Europe, rather than France, and continuing on to Berlin even though it had little immediate military value at the time, the United States refused. The value of his latter opinion is only too well evidenced by the situation in which the United States and the Free World now finds itself as regards the Berlin issue. Thus thinking in terms of the military implementation of United States foreign policy, a re-evaluation might be taken on the so called military NEW LOOK of 'more bang to the buck' and massive retaliation as the corner stones of United States policy.

## II. ONE WEAPON, ONE STRATEGY

Former President Eisenhower himself stated that undue reliance on one weapon just prompted the enemy to resort to another.<sup>2</sup> United States military strategy therefore, must be flexible and responsive to foreign policy. Statesmen must not be put into an atomic straight-jacket in their dealings with the Communists. Hand in hand with

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<sup>2</sup>Carl H. Amme, Jr., "Psychological Effects of Nuclear Weapons", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (April 1960), p. 32

nuclear parity has been the gulf between declaratory and 'actions' policies of the nuclear armed Western powers. The Free World finds itself bluffing from weakness in the area of limited war rather than from strength. From Laos to Africa this is evident. Such a situation is certainly dangerous and promotes instability throughout the world. A wide latitude of decision must be allowed then, in order to bargain effectively at the conference table. The option of total war or inaction must not be their only alternatives in the face of Communist maneuvers.

If total war means are the only adequate ones available to the United States by which to counter Communist efforts to absorb friendly or neutral countries, these nations may well choose to accept Communist domination as the lesser of two evils. Smaller nations of the world, determined to maintain and develop their freedom, probably agree with patriot Patrick Henry's statement of "give me liberty or give me death", but it is seriously doubted whether they will accept the idea of "give me liberty and give me death", by means of our atomic arsenal.

However, in order to understand that there are options open to the United States, other than total war or inaction, a brief review of history is in order.

### III. BACKGROUND OF TOTAL, LIMITED AND UNCONVENTIONAL WAR

All out, total, or general wars, based on purely military considerations are exceptions in history rather than the norm. They usually come about when there has been an abdication of political leadership or whenever such a deep schism has arisen between the two national antagonists that total destruction is deemed the only acceptable solution.

After the cruel and devastating religious war of the Reformation in the 16th and 17th century had torn Europe asunder, statesmen and leaders of the day, began to cast a jaundiced eye on such total war techniques for accomplishing national objectives. They began to realize that the victors in these bloody conflicts emerged in almost as weakened a condition as the vanquished. It was noted too, that third powers, relatively untouched by these conflicts were often able to step into the breach. Thus by the 18th century, European leaders and statesmen, by tacit agreement, decided to check their passions and ambitions and to limit their conflicts. Restrictions were placed on military operations and the sacking and burnings of villages that characterized the Religious Wars was curtailed. In other words, they engaged in limited wars for limited gains or objectives, and were ready to negotiate a peace at the propitious moment when it became

evident that the maximum gains could not be realized.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the pendulum began to swing back towards total war again. With the concept of a 'nation in arms' of the French Revolution, the conflicts became more sanguinary. Napoleon began to abandon his former use of superb tactics and astute diplomacy, which had produced earlier victories, and came to depend more and more on sheer weight of numbers. Between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and World War I however, an era of limited war ensued. Politicians were willing to accept limited risks in the interest of achieving national objectives. Except for the American Civil War fought during this period, no international war approached the earlier unrestrained violence of the Reformation or the Napoleonic Wars.

The twentieth century, with the advent of World War I, ushered in an era of total war again. Warfare of increasing intensity and an attendant rise in casualties was the result. The total resources of the chief antagonists were thrown into the fray. Unconditional surrender came to be the order of the day. World War II and the subsequent introductions of new and improved weapons of mass destruction such as the atomic bomb was the epitomy of total war compared to earlier conflicts.

Like limited war, neither is unconventional war a really novel method. From ancient times opposing forces have infiltrated each others ranks and struck their opponents sources of political and economic powers to undermine morale. From the writings of Sun Tzu, early Chinese military strategist of 500 B.C., we note a statement to the effect that supreme excellence in war is in the ability of the commander to break the enemy's resistance without fighting him on the battlefield.<sup>3</sup> In the Peninsular Campaign of the Napoleonic War's, we see guerilla warfare first defined as used by the Spanish people against Napoleon's armies.

However, unconventional warfare did not come into its own until the advent of modern mass society and the improved means of communications. Formerly, targets of warfare were only the opposing soldiers on the battlefield. Today's techniques seek to overleap the strictly military battlefield. The targets are whole nations or populations and sources of national power. In the present world struggle, unconventional warfare, long a tool of the Soviet, is a ready made vehicle for revolution and civil war. Since the abortive Summit Meeting in June 1960, the Communists

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<sup>3</sup>Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1944), p. 48

have stepped up their waging of this type of warfare from Southeast Asia and Africa to the Caribbean. The West has failed to build up or exploit this capability which can be a two edged sword in combatting Communism and assisting captive and Communist oppressed people throughout the world.

Today, with the threat of a thermo-nuclear holocaust facing two of the most powerful protagonists the world has ever seen, the pendulum may again by swinging back in the direction of limited war. Like the intricate maneuverings of opposing armies for position in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Cold War has its political, psychological and military maneuverings between the great powers for decisive advantages. Limited war, or unconventional war, thus may be the war of the future, especially when both combatants have the means of mutual nuclear retaliation, rather than risk mutual ruin and devastation. Thus so called all out nuclear war may be approaching obsolescence as a means of attaining national objectives.

## CHAPTER III

### THE COMMUNIST AND AMERICAN APPROACH TO WAR AND FORCE AS TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Americans have generally tended to regard international politics in somewhat idealistic terms, where the natural state of things is harmonious.<sup>1</sup> The Communists on the other hand regard conflict as natural and force and violence as an integral part of international relations. The past history of the Communist Party proves this and one has only to glance over Communist doctrinal works from Marx to Lenin's book, What Is To Be Done, to realize this. The Communists regard the fusion of military power and foreign policy as in direct contrast to the American tradition of dis-association of the two. War or military force as an instrument for attaining concrete political objectives is regarded by Americans as unworthy of a proud and idealistic nation. In the book, Foundations of National Power, the following excerpt seems best to sum up this attitude:

Many Americans not only agree that such a difference in national attitude exists but pride themselves on this difference. They talk as if it were merely selfish and calculating to fight a war for any reason beyond itself, and as if winning the war and then going home were the only altruistic and noble course for us to pursue.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p.43

<sup>2</sup>Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of National Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 693



This view of the complete disassociation of military and foreign policy must be changed more rapidly than at present. The United States must alter its old ideas in approaching these problems. A more hard-headed, realistic and flexible policy must be initiated. Military force should be regarded as a tool for attaining national objectives not an objective in and of itself.

#### I. AMERICA LOOKS AT WAR AND FORCE

Americans find it difficult to implement the ideas of Clausewitz concerning war simply being a continuation of politics by violent means. War and peace to Americans are opposites and have no continuity to the political conflict. Foreign policy has been made during times of peace with little regard for military power considerations. Conversely, when at war, continuing foreign policy considerations have been ignored and only military aspects considered. Wars have been fought to end all wars or to make the world safe for democracy with no thought of the need of supporting foreign policy by force if necessary after the wars are concluded. Such policies have brought neither peace nor security for America.

Present day Americans also have a great distaste for violence, especially as a means of resolving conflicts.

One military official summed it up this way recently, when he said, "What we need is a counterbalance to the philosophy that we never need to fight and than everything can be achieved by concession and compromise."<sup>3</sup> Thus a war for limited goals of national policy is regarded as most immoral and cynical. However, a war forced on the United States especially for ideological reasons is not in disfavor. It is only natural too that war is regarded with revulsion in our culture which places a high value on the life of the individual and his material well-being. Our repugnance for war has given Americans an emotional approach to it that rules out all but purely military considerations. General MacArthur might be regarded as one of the foremost proponents of this pure war philosophy - war pursued to a victory presumably involving unconditional surrender.

Added to the above factors is the typical American aversion to power politics on the international scene. Such tactics have been attributed to wicked and unscrupulous statesmen and are only to be used by the United States as a last resort during a severe crisis. This arises from an unrealistic ideal that somehow international power politics will be conducted on a high and idealistic plane

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<sup>3</sup>Everett Allan, "Guantanamo, Frontline of the Americas", New Bedford Standard Times, (January 7, 1961), p. 28

devoid of, and above, power politics and conflicts. For Americans whose own Constitution recognizes that internal conflict of interests is inevitable, and contains checks and balances to control these conflicts, this seems to be a most naive and unrealistic philosophy. Thus diplomacy is supposed to be above power conflicts and based on moral principles. This often leaves United States statesmen with little flexibility. In wartime, compromises or concessions seem like appeasements and limited settlements humiliating and frustrating.

Probably the greatest factor in this American tendency to regard military and foreign policy considerations in two separate and distinct spheres is the ingrained anti-militarist tradition in this country. The so called military mind is suspect and there still seems to be a fear of military influence in government. This antiquated idea of the colonial period of our history still seems to persist. Statesmen and politicians are to be concerned with only political matters and military men only with military matters. Never the twain shall meet seems to be the theory, when in reality, military and political considerations are intertwined as never before. Even to the most obtuse person, this factor cannot be overlooked in the Cold War about the globe today. The fact that military men in

increasing numbers are taking courses in Political Science is evidence of their awareness of the influence of one upon the other. One unnamed military man summed it up well when he stated, "I was greatly disappointed in the Symington Report. It never touched on the greatest of problems at all, the inevitable relationship between the military and the political".<sup>4</sup>

## II. THE COMMUNISTS LOOK AT WAR AND FORCE

Unlike Americans, the Communists skillfully blend their military and political doctrine and forces to attain national objectives. They take to heart the dictums of the German, Clausewitz, that war is a continuation of politics. Communist leaders from Marx to Lenin and Mao Tse Tsung, have all studied his work with interest.

Even though the Communists profess that their ideal state embodies all that a Christian one does, (i.e. universal peace, brotherly love, concern for the humble and down-trodden, etc.,) they have no compunctions about using force and violence against so called heretics, and thus it is that the revolutionary teachings of Lenin are carried over into international relations and politics. The whole spectrum of warfare, from psychological war-

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid

fare to terrorism, war by proxy and open warfare, are advocated by the Soviet and the Red Chinese as an integrated part of their international relations. When warfare of one sort or another can attain the national objectives sought by them, they are not squeamish about utilizing it. They do not disassociate war and foreign policy considerations, nor are they adverse to violence.

Neither do the Communist leaders picture international politics and diplomacy as a harmonious state. They expect power conflicts among nations and regard such as normal; as previously stated, Americans for some reason, certainly not one compatible with their own national scene, regard such conflicts as unnatural. War and peace are not to be totally separated and compartmented into two different spheres by the Communists, but are regarded as simply two ends of the scale measuring the intensity of the protracted conflict between the two ideologies. Born in revolution where politics came first, the Communists are well able to blend force and diplomacy and make one serve the other.

For the Chinese Communists especially, the final political success is the purpose of warfare. If it is to their advantage to prolong the war, they do so without any compunctions. War serves the purpose of politics and

does not become the master of it. This was amply demonstrated in Korea.

## CHAPTER IV

### WAR AND FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

War and the use of force is not a game, nor should it be regarded as national suicide. It should be a means of attaining national objectives through the judicious use of force. Thus conflicts must not be an end unto themselves, but should have a national purpose and be utilized to further a National Policy.

#### I. NUCLEAR WAR VS CONVENTIONAL

The ever growing strength of Soviet nuclear warfare means opens up to them an increasingly wide range of political and military options by which to pursue their aims.

Former Secretary of the Army Brucker, pointed out last year, that two thirds of the Soviet military budget was still being spent on the world's largest land army.<sup>1</sup>

Wars initiated by Russian satellites under ambiguous circumstances still pose a most difficult problem to United States military and diplomatic planners. United States strategic nuclear capabilities are necessary to deter a surprise attack and general war, but we may find that we

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<sup>1</sup>Wilbur M. Brucker, "Military Obstacles to World Peace", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXVI, No. 7, (January 1960), p. 168

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<sup>1</sup>Wilbur M. Brucker, "Military Obstacles to World Peace", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXVI, No. 7, (January 1960), p. 168

have no deterrent challenge below the threshold of the issue of United States survival. This country finds its former superiority in nuclear striking power negated by Soviet growing nuclear strength, which now gives their large conventional forces the edge. This is especially true during the so called missile gap period. Even if it is closed, a de facto strategic nuclear disarmament may result. Then the balance of power may rest with the side possessing the most adequate conventional forces. Henry A. Kissinger, in his new book, The Necessity of Choice, supports this previously expressed idea.

The question remains of whether this country will risk 30 to 90 million United States casualties or more from nuclear war in an attempt to stop Communists from taking over the world on the installment plan.<sup>2</sup>

## II. BIG NUCLEAR ARMIES VS SMALL NUCLEAR ARMIES

One of the prime arguments given for cutting conventional forces is that our superiority in tactical atomic weapons negates Communist power advantages. This may have been true previously, with out superior nuclear power and delivery advantages. Seventeen NATO

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<sup>2</sup>Alvin J. Cottrell, "Military Security and the New Look", Current History, (April 1960), p. 221

Divisions with nuclear weapons might have formerly equalled 200 Soviet Divisions with inferior nuclear power. However, cancel out that nuclear factor on both sides of this equation, and the equal signs are no longer true. A good big nuclear army can defeat a small nuclear army like a good big heavyweight boxer can outlast and batter-down a flyweight.

Let us consider a purely hypothetical case of a country (country A), and another country (country B), who both possess nuclear arms. Say for example that country A is faced by increasingly hostile acts and border incursions by its more powerful neighbor, country B. 'B' covets certain portions of 'A's territory. The harrassed Chief of State of country A calls his military advisor for consultation and they make an estimate of the situation and explore the possible courses of action to be followed. Three courses of action are finally proposed for study. The first course of action involves a nuclear strike by A against the homeland of B or the direct source of trouble. Course of action two entails the initiation of so-called limited nuclear war by use of tactical nuclear weapons against B's military forces. Finally, the third possibility of conventional war is discussed.

Without going into all the lengthy staff procedures involved, the tentative conclusions reached by all parties concerned might be as follows:

Course of Action 1 (nuclear strike against B's homeland) - rejected on the grounds that the inevitable retaliation would mean unacceptable civilian casualties to country A in addition to the destruction of its major cities and much of its heavy industry.

Course of Action 2 (initiation of limited nuclear war) - This course is given considerable study, but it is finally shelved, also due to the feeling that A would suffer much more than B in the final outcome. B's larger, well equipped, modern forces, also equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, with their greater staying power, could weather the nuclear storm better than A. However, A really wonders whether such a conflict could be kept limited once started. Again we return to the fears that caused rejection of the first course of action.

Course of Action 3 (conventional war) - This course is also rejected finally - B's larger, modern force, which can attack in overwhelming strength once A gives them a good cause, could quickly over run and occupy A before sufficient allied strength could be rushed to their aid.

The offshoot of the whole conference is that the ruler of A is advised against becoming involved in any serious conflict for the present. The only advice that is finally gleaned from his advisors might be that negotiation from a flexible position is the best course, yet to give up as little as possible.

This hypothetical case illustrates what Free World diplomatic and military men face. However, even the naive student of international relations must realize that to negotiate successfully, a nation must also have an adequate and balanced military posture with which to strengthen its hand at the conference table. One cannot negotiate from a position of weakness. Once the balance of military power goes over to an enemy, the political power soon follows. Chinese Communist Mao Tse Tsung is once to have said that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

The day of limited war as an instrument of international politics is not over as has been shown repeatedly since the end of World War II. Lebanon was one example where the United States reacted quickly and effectively through the use of sea borne, ready, amphibious forces, strategically positioned with their own mobile logistical and tactical air support. Events much closer to home,

the Carribean, and on the other side of the globe, in Laos and the Congo, give indications that limited war and other coordinated means may well be gaining in popularity as the war of the future. Therefore, we must be prepared.

## CHAPTER V

### LIMITED WAR, UNCONVENTIONAL WAR FORCES AND U.S. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles stated that he felt that if we had the strength and means for total war, we could very simply deter and take care of the little wars.<sup>1</sup> This has not been the case, however, as evidenced by Korea, Indo China, Suez, Hungary, Tibet, Lebanon and Laos to mention a few. Certain limited war situations such as guerilla warfare give no basis for the use of nuclear weapons. To distinguish lucrative nuclear targets under the immense rain forest canopies of Laos or the Congo for example, and to utilize such total war weapons, defies description. Strictly total war forces find themselves quite ineffectual in these circumstances. It might be likened to attempting the apprehension of a backwoods poacher with a 280 mm atomic cannon.

#### I. THE NEED FOR LIMITED WAR FORCES

Even where the United States had an atomic monopoly and later a clear and continuing superiority in versatility of nuclear striking power, the Communists have not been deterred from creeping aggression. Some 800 million people and

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<sup>1</sup>Carl Amme, "Psychological Effects of Nuclear Weapons", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (April 1960), p. 33

millions of additional square miles of territory have been added to their empire since the end of World War II.<sup>2</sup> The case has simply been that the United States and its allies have become so preoccupied with total war that they have de-emphasized the means to deter lesser but equally dangerous forms of aggression. Lack of flexibility in maneuver, both in diplomatic and military circles, has been the result of relying on total war means. It seemed that no policies were formulated or objectives obtained that did not rely on nuclear weapons. As yet, the West has not been able to utilize or apply these new nuclear weapons as a graduated deterrent force for the furthering of our national objectives. Korea was a prime example of our being unable to bridge the gap between military doctrine and political decisions. All manner of reasons were given, from it might catapult us into total war, to the statement that atomic weapons were not applicable, or that it was the wrong war in the wrong place with the wrong enemy. In view of the fact that a prominent Russian diplomat speaking at Yale last spring stated that various 'civil wars' throughout the trouble spots of the world would eventually place the Communists in charge, this country might well again find

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<sup>2</sup>Anthony W. Wermuth, "Of Dollars and Sons", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, (August 1959), p. 74



itself fighting the wrong enemy at the wrong time in the wrong place.

It has become self evident even to the most parochial air power and total war enthusiasts that this country must have a graduated means of employing force. As in a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta, our motto must be "make the punishment fit the crime". This graduated force is a vital necessity to give flexibility to United States diplomatic and military planning and enable it to cope with a variety of situations around the globe.

Despite these facts, United States limited war forces have been dwindling since the Korean truce and are certainly not getting any stronger. At the same time, this country is faced with world wide defense commitments practically everywhere in the world from SEATO to Korea, and from Latin America to NATO.

Two prime factors have helped this reduction of limited war forces. The first has been increased cost of maintaining an up to date strategic striking force and the other has been the transition to tactical nuclear weapons forces. With the Communists appearing more agreeable (up until Krushchev's outbursts at the Summit Meeting and the United Nations), and the talk of disarmament, there were many who comfortably felt that the

Communists had abandoned military means and would only pursue their aims on the political and economic front. These people ignore Communist China or the possibility of limited war situations in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa or Latin America, not even sparked by the Communists but never the less conflicts in which the United States might become involved.

The feeling in other circles seems to be that the only type of future limited war that can be kept limited will be one like those of Quemoy, Matsu, Lebanon or in some very isolated spot. Since future limited wars the size of Korea are impossible, they argue, why build up any force to counter anything of larger proportions. This does not infer that the United States will rely wholly on massive retaliation but it does mean that the West and its allies will utilize tactical nuclear weapons, and engage in what Dr. Kissinger refers to as limited nuclear war. How we can establish mutually acceptable restraints in this so-called limited nuclear war is a good question. Just what is limited nuclear war or a tactical nuclear weapon; or as in the case of the question of chemical warfare, it is easier to have no gas at all as we had in World War II than to have a little gas or just one type of gas. Can we agree with our enemies

on what the upper yield limit of tactical nuclear weapons will be and if so can we enforce these agreements? Has anything been done to the violators of the Korean Armistice agreement? Also, what about restrictions, regarding the use of these weapons around cities, especially, if we're fighting in defense of friendly nations on their home soil. Will the enemy be as concerned for our allies? These and many other questions arise when limited nuclear war is suggested. The fact remains however, that we do have need for well-balanced and versatile forces prepared trained and equipped to fight limited wars (conventional or nuclear), whatever shape they may take, under all conditions of weather and terrain.

## II. FORCE SPECIFICATIONS

With the need to maintain specialized total war forces as a deterrent to Soviet surprise attack, the U.S. cannot afford to maintain large separate total and limited war only forces. Our forces must thus be versatile, have a dual capacity and be able to function in either general or limited war as the need arises. Forces in this category, especially adapted for limited war, should possess the following characteristics:

1. Be comprised in the main of mobile ground or amphibious troops with adequate transportation to

enable them to get to the scene of the crisis quickly.

2. Have adequate tactical air support
3. Be ready, professional, balanced forces in being, able to move out immediately in order to prevent a 'fait accompli' on the part of the aggressor, and to keep the situation from deteriorating into a general war situation.
4. Consist of well-trained self sufficient, professional forces with a high degree of esprit, capable of independent, small unit operations and ready and willing to fight in frustrating and often unpopular type wars.

Mobile, versatile Fleet Marine Forces, embarked with full logistical and air support aboard units of the battle fleets, strategically prepositioned about the world as they are today, are ideally suited for such limited war missions. They can operate along the periphery of the Eurasian rimland without need of expensive and immobile bases and air fields nearby. Neither do they need to worry about violating the territorial integrity or the air space of the nations in the vicinity of the potential trouble area. These forces can also remain off such areas for long periods of time, without violating international

law but serving as a strategic deterrent force awaiting the moment of decision for commitment. Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific are organized, trained and equipped to fight with or without nuclear weapons. In addition, they have available to them Navy assault transports, a limited number of transport and cargo submarines, helicopters and a very limited number of Marine and MATS transport aircraft. This gives them both surface, sub-surface and air mobility systems. Though hindered by the coming block obsolescence of assault shipping and the slippage in new fast helicopter and aircraft carriers, and other new fast assault shipping programs, these amphibious forces are not faced with as critical a transportation problem as the Army's airborne STRAC forces.

Army airborne forces are another valuable member of the limited war teams. Present inability of air alone to transport and land heavy weapons such as tanks and full logistic support along with combat units is one of their drawbacks for distant operations. Fighter protection and overflight rights in the air space over neutral and even friendly countries in route to the objective is an ever increasing problem, especially in view of the sensitivity of many of these countries to such flights. However, the lack of an adequate airlift capability in this country is

their most serious limitation. An analysis of the last years air movement of troops from the U.S. to Puerto Rico, Operation Puerto Rico Fine, underlined the total lack of adequate air lift for an even minor 'brush fire' war.<sup>3</sup> Even though President Kennedy has recently ordered procurement of additional transport aircraft in order to improve the situation, it will be some time before they are available. Add to this the suitability of these aircraft for landing only on a large improved field and the situation is far from rectified. Therefore, it can be seen that our limited war forces, in addition to have taken manpower and budget cuts, slippages in new weapons procurement, and transportation means are severely strained to meet their immense commitments.

When discussing the need for limited forces, few people realize that since World War II more than twenty-three conflicts, with a half dozen more recently to be added to the total, many of them aided and abetted by the Communists, have been fought, all involving the use of conventional weapons.<sup>4</sup> Limited war and limited war situations may occur with increasing frequency, especially in view

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<sup>3</sup>"MATS Probe Continues", Army, Navy, Air Force Register and Defense Times, (April 2, 1960), p. 13

<sup>4</sup>Alvin Cottrell, "Military Security and the New Look", Current History, (April 1960), p. 221

of the ever growing Communist efforts to gain the upper hand in the many weak, newly-independent, under-developed countries of the world just coming of age.

### III. NEED FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WAR FORCES

As an adjunct to the accomplishment of political and military objectives of the Free World, unconventional warfare forces must be organized and utilized. The Western world tends to rely on super 'gimmicks' and machines to give it a cheap road to security. The value of the individual man, even though we place a high value on human life, is often overlooked. In our preoccupation with super weapons and missiles we overlook the human element. What lies beneath the blatant Soviet propoganda blasts and missile rattlings? Beneath all this outward show of crude strength lie millions of frustrated, embittered and discontented peoples. This has been demonstrated since the end of World War II by defections, revolts, riots and uprisings from areas of the Soviet Union itself, through to Hungary, Poland and East Germany. The fact that Hungarian Freedom Fighters opposed the might of the Red Army, shows that oppressed peoples, if sufficiently provoked, will fight against overwhelming odds to gain their freedom. Irregular forces, working behind Communist lines would certainly be a powerful ally of the West in any future conflict. This

is especially important when the present disparity in numbers of ground combat forces in being between the Communists and Free World is noted. Research from records of World War I and II indicate that one guerilla, underground or related unconventional type fighter tied down from ten to fifteen regular soldiers. Thus an enemy must have from fifteen to twenty times more numerous a force to maintain security and cope with such attacks which come from every quarter. German statistics from World War II show that 612,000 of their troops were engaged in the Balkans in anti-guerilla activities. This immense force was tied down by approximately 25,000 to 45,000 guerillas and their supporting undergrounds.<sup>5</sup> Winston Churchill in his World War II book, Closing the Ring, stated that guerilla forces in Yugoslavia and Albania contained as many German divisions as did the British and American armies put together. Cadres of such forces should be maintained and organized by the Western democracies.

The fact that conventional warfare in Europe, rather than defense by United States nuclear annihilation, may greatly encourage captive peoples to turn against their Communist oppressors, should give even greater impetus for

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<sup>5</sup> Slavko, Bjelajac, "Strategy of Protracted Defense", Special Warfare Newsletter, (September 1960), p. 5



unconventional war preparations by the West. Even in limited war situations about the globe where present United States sea and air transportation will be severely taxed to meet commitments, previously organized unconventional warfare forces or cadres would be of great assistance. Where time is vital they would compensate for the lack of Western ready forces on the spot and could tie down hostile forces and disrupt enemy logistics and troops movements until help arrived.

Therefore, United States unconventional warfare plans and unconventional warfare forces should be given a greater priority than at present. Such a force is a relatively inexpensive weapon which can play a most vital part in defeating Communism. This type of warfare should also be more fully integrated into Western defense schemes. It too can be a most potent weapon if used with vigor and imagination in defeating Communist aggression.

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It cannot be over emphasized that foreign policy and our military policy must be such that we not only achieve close coordination but that they are flexible and give us freedom of choice. They must not each operate in a vacuum, but must be duly coordinated. A military policy restricted to the use of one weapon or limited to one strategy gives our statesmen and our military little freedom of action in attaining our national objectives. Total war, has not always been the state of the art. In fact, limited war for limited gains has been the rule rather than the exception throughout most of history, and under the threat of nuclear warfare the pendulum may again be swinging back to this concept.

#### I. SUMMARY

Whereas Americans have tended to regard war and peace as complete opposites with no continuity or connecting threads between the two in the arena of world politics, the Communists do not. They skillfully blend force and diplomacy, or the military and the diplomatic, to achieve national objectives. They do not view international politics in such idealistic and harmonious terms as Americans but as

a continuing conflict of power interests. Thus the Communists in pursuit of their diplomatic objectives are prepared, willing and able to present the Western Democracies with a wide variety of offensive moves, running from total war threats, psychological warfare, mob violence and terrorism to limited war.

United States preoccupation with general war has caused it to de-emphasize means of combatting limited war or limited war situations. Meanwhile, United States world wide commitments have been increasing, especially in those areas where aggression by the Communists, either outright warfare or through their more ambiguous type of aggression, is imminent. The costly building up of strategic forces and the philosophy that we can handle any further limited aggression with tactical, smaller yield, nuclear weapons has contributed to a lowering of our over all limited war posture. The build up of Communist nuclear strength may negate the Free World philosophy of so called limited nuclear war where tactical atomic fire power only on our side formerly equalized the great conventional masses of the Communists. This is no longer true, and it is very doubtful whether a limited nuclear war alone will be possible.

Limited war forces must be ready, professional, mobile, air, ground forces able to move out quickly to the world's trouble spots and prepared to fight either conven-

tional or nuclear wars as the situation dictates. Army STRAC in the United States and mobile, ready Fleet Marine Force integrated air-ground task forces, strategically positioned around the periphery of the Communist heartland are especially suited to these tasks. The ability of these forces to meet their world wide commitments must be improved.

Certain types of limited war situations, war by proxy or guerilla warfare give no basis for nuclear war weapons and strictly general war type forces are ineffective. Limited war or unconventional war type forces can only function effectively here. Lack of adequate such forces will lead to defeat against superior enemy forces of this type. With the Communist world also having nuclear weapons available, the Free World is faced with either defeat, initiation of nuclear war or abdication of its defense responsibilities throughout its world wide system of alliances.

## II. CONCLUSION

The stark realities of the power struggle between Communism and the West cannot be ignored. Even when the United States had a nuclear monopoly, the Communists were able to push ahead vigorously by varied means short of total war. The chief method used was by limited war and terrorism, initiated under ambiguous circumstances which gave no

opportunity for the use of nuclear weapons. Because the United States' foreign policy was tied to a one weapon military strategy, it was likewise hampered and unable to react quickly to those diverse threats. The Soviet's then developed their own nuclear weapons and the Korean crisis faced this country with a choice between total war, limited conventional war or inaction. The United States had no choice, though initially ill-prepared, but to take the second option.

Today with the Soviets possessing a more varied array of total war weapons systems than ever before, in addition to large, modern, well equipped ground forces and tactical air forces, the United States must be prepared to meet a varied number of threats and forms of aggression. The Communist tactic of holding this country at bay with its arsenal of retaliatory thermo-nuclear weapons while initiating limited aggression throughout the world, even in our own hemisphere, may become more prevalent. If the United States does not have adequate limited and unconventional war means to counter Communist threats and the courage to utilize them, our leaders may have no other choices than total war with all its terrible implications for the American people, or abdication of the Free World position around the globe.

In an era of mutual deterrence against total war, our enemies will of necessity become more adventurous in fostering these so called insurrections and 'civil wars'. The Western powers and their allies can expect more of these limited and unconventional type wars to occur in increased scope and severity. United States national security must have, in addition to its nuclear retaliatory power, a more adequate, flexible force which can be applied with discrimination and restraint to limit and defeat Communist political and military objectives.

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
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APPENDIX

# United States Collective Defense Arrangements



U.S. and countries with which it has mutual defense treaties  
Communist bloc

### WEST EUROPE


France building its own H-bomb, preoccupied by war in Algeria, unhappy with North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Britain at odds with U.S. over Laos, under propaganda pressure to close U.S. bases. West Germany worried about Berlin, fearful U.S. troops will be pulled out of Europe.

### MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

Algeria nearing crisis in war against France, with Communist influence growing. Morocco forcing out strategic U.S. bases. Egypt, once Western base, now armed by Moscow and closed to West. Iraq, once hub of Western defenses, now lost to West. Turkey, weak, beset by internal troubles. Iran, shaky, target of Communist subversion.


### FAR EAST

Japan restless, trending neutral. Korea ripped by political disorder. Formosa expecting new Red thrusts at offshore islands. Pakistan seeking Soviet aid. India troubled by Chinese Communists on her border.




### WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Canada tending to nationalism, anti-U.S. sentiment showing up. Cuba a Communist satellite. Venezuela shaky. Guatemala and whole of Central America under Castro-Communist pressure. Mexico neutralist. Panama: Canal in danger, anti-Americanism growing. Brazil talking trade with Russia.



### CENTRAL AFRICA

Congo disintegrating in chaos, Communist-created turmoil. Guinea serving as Communist beachhead to infiltrate black Africa. Ghana lining up on Communist side.



### SOUTHEAST ASIA

Laos reeling under Communist attack. Cambodia "neutral," dealing with Communists. Thailand, U.S. ally, showing interest in Communist aid. South Vietnam, propped up by U.S., infested with Communist guerrillas. Burma dealing with Chinese Reds. Indonesia, weak, under steady Communist pressure.